Steve Sherlock and Stephen Young discuss the Vietnam War

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Stephen Young, an attorney who was with the USAID in Vietnam and taught Vietnamese history at the University of Minnesota; and Steve Sherlock, a Vietnam combat veteran, former activist in Vietnam Veterans Against the War, and founder and president of Aid to Southeast Asia, discuss the Vietnam War and any lessons that can be learned from U.S. involvement. Young and Sherlock also answer listener questions. The end of April marks the 20th anniversary of the unconditional surrender of South Vietnam to the Communists. Helicopters evacuated the American remaining in Saigon as well as thousands of South Vietnamese.

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20 years ago on April 30th 1975 the North Vietnamese Army marched into Saigon bringing to an end the long costly war in Vietnam, but the debate over that war continues fuel to get in this month by the release of Former Defense. Secretary Robert McNamara's Memoirs in which among other things McNamara says US policy was wrong terribly wrong McNamara like so many before I'm says he decided to write his books or the us could learn the lessons of Vietnam what day we thought we'd spend the hour trying to determine just what some of those lessons might be joining us here in the studio are two men and served in Vietnam during the War and who have been involved involved with Vietnam sense Steve Sherlock served in Vietnam from 1968 to 69 on the hundred first Airborne Steven young work for the u.s. Agency for International Development from 1968 to 1971. Both have been back to Vietnam several times in recent years working on projects with the Vietnamese gentleman. Thanks for coming by.I really appreciate it. See you both of you are stevens or Steve. So it seems Sherlock. Can we call you Steve? That's fine. I will call you Steven for now. That's fine. Give us a quick quick summary of of your involvement in this. Well I pointed out I was served in Vietnam in 1968-69. I enlisted in the Army in 1966 for a number of reasons personal ideological and at that time I believed firmly in the u.s. Policy and in the winnability the war over the years between my enlistment and 66 and actually going to Vietnam. I began to develop some misgivings about the war and after serving per year in Vietnam by upon my return to the US like many people I shifted my position and and rethinking a decided that we really should not be involved in that war and I then spent about two years working.With that in peace moving from 7072 Indiana War movement and I pretty much disengage from Vietnam from the early 70s until late 80 when I returned in 89 for the first time to Vietnam and became very interested in developing a humanitarian aid for Vietnam. And since that time I've made numerous trips. I've been back to Vietnam about eight or nine times working in a variety capacities delivering humanitarian aid while with a to Southeast Asia organization that works out of Minneapolis and also working now with some more recently some business of people making a few notes your I've been personally deeply involved in on 441 years my dad and 19 54 and 55 of presided for the state department over the American commitment to Vietnam and I servedCell phone in the courts program and I married a Vietnamese woman we 1975 when the when the country was being taken over. I sort of spark the refugee decision by the United States went to Washington ask my friends to say you we got him help our side are people can't let them all just go into the hands of the Communist. I then helped Ellsworth bunker. Write his Memoirs. He was our ambassador in Saigon for many years. I help translate the Les Dynasty law code in English or 1433 and recently I've been involved in some talks with communist leadership on reconciliation and democratization of Vietnam, but in November 1993 with pressure from communist China our seminar on development where General Westmoreland was going to come back was a cancel by the police and I was taking interrogated for 36 hours and negotiated the my release by signing a confession.McNamara right was this all of a horrible mistake that this country made. I cannot agree. I cannot agree. I think I've been thinking about Magnum air over the weekend with all the Press coverage and I have a deep feeling that this is a flawed man and he is now projecting out on all of us who went through the Vietnam experience a bitter experience his own failures. This says, I read the excerpts of his booking Newsweek. I had a feeling you sort of white man's victimization. He says, yes, it was wrong but never says I McNamara what's wrong. He said I was misled we didn't have experts Johnson had the wrong policy and I think he's dealing with inner demons and it's not fair to protect his inner demons out on this complicated history. I guess what are a couple of things we might note that Steve and I have known each other for a number of years and they're there are many things that we disagree. In fact probably few things. We agree on one of them mightThat the history statement about McNamara. I think I'm critical of McNamara, but I don't think that it's it's quite in the same vein as is Steve is taking I do believe that the policy was wrong and flood although answers of simple right and wrong and what was best not best in relation to our policy in a relation to Vietnam simple answers are not always available and not always reasonable but I think that the problem with McNamara the judgement call about whether the policy was right and wrong is subject to debate and Steve believes. It's right. I believe it was wrong. So in that sense, I agree with McNamara. I agree with Steve that that McNamara has done a disservice in Waiting 30 years to make the statements that and I think that if he in fact understood their the policy to be an error 3 years ago, he had a certainly a moral commitment to have made that public at the time and then I find it hypocritical thatThere was a 30-year labs in publishing that perspective says there are a number of lessons to be learned from Vietnam. And if that was the principal reason he wrote his Memoirs and we've heard this repeatedly over the years. We must learn the lessons of Vietnam. Do either one of you have one like one lesson that we could learn from that war that would be applicable to Future situations. I I think I have a simple one and it's respect National Independence and National sovereignty. I think that the major error in Vietnam was not respecting the ability rate of Vietnam to determine its own destiny agree on the theory. We disagree on the application and practice because I believe that our policy in Vietnam was writing correct and Justified because we were on the side of the Nationalist what this is going to come down to Gary is the oldest shoe. What was Ho Chi Minh a nationalist or communist and I think the historical record is now absolutely clear. He was pushing to have a Communist party in a classical style in a sense come to power in Vietnam and impose its will when communism is completely I have besides completely inconsistent with poor Vietnamese. Values of individualism in private property it so from that point of view. I think the premises and which American policy rested were correct where I think we went wrong in our policy was one frankly on the military side. We never cut the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos. I think there is a great lesson to be learned that if you're fighting a long Peoples War with it were an outside power in this case North Vietnam is sending men and supplies inside. You have to cut the infiltration and we never did that. I was a Johnson refused to go into the house until it was too late. Why is the military handcuffed by politicians? So that's something else that we hear a lot that if only the military had been allowed to do as it wanted to do we could have won the war. I guess. Let me proceed to buy have did we lose the war? Agreement on that yes, and no again. There there very few simple statements, but I think we we rarely lost militarily. I think there were but they were we won most of the battles. I think we lost the war but that's again in a prospective. I would put it this way. We lost the war in the sense that end on April 30th 1975 the North Vietnamese conquered South Vietnam in explicit violation of their promises in the Peace Accords. They were able to conquer South Vietnam because in the Peace Accords Henry Kissinger allowed them to leave their army inside South Vietnam prior to that between 1968 and 1972 and those for years. I believe we won the war on the ground. We defeated the Viet Cong guerrillas. That's what I was involved with pacification rural development. And we pushed with South Vietnamese helped the North Vietnamese out to the borders of the country and then in 1972 the South Vietnamese Army without any support American ground troops basically held their own against the massive Invasion. We help them with B-52 bombers. So we won but then in 75 we lost. I like to say we won the war, but we lost the piece and that has been has worked out very badly for this country because we as Americans with our traditions of righteousness leading to success. We don't know how to deal with the feet and set back. Let's get some listeners involved you were talking with a couple of gentlemen who spent time in Vietnam during the war and it's been a lot of time in Vietnam since working on various projects of Steve Sherlock and Stephan young and what we're doing today is talking about the Vietnam War 20 years ago. The war came to me. It came to an end North Vietnamese took over Saigon effectively ending award medipac today marks the 20th anniversary of the fall of Cambodia. And what with Robert McNamara's book out which is kind of fuel this whole debate again. We thought it would be a good time to spend some time talking about the war and more specifically those elusive lessons that there we keep hearing about from the Vietnam War first caller. Is it from Plymouth? Jeff happened? I'm a child of the sixties and protested the war in the early seventies and thought it was wrong. I've been reading the article play lie about McNamara and I think I share Steve comments. I believe which Steve pick up sooner. I guess that's what bothers me and my question to the panel is a group is it looks like you will what if scenario if Kennedy had lived do you think he would have maybe for smacking me listen to McNamara little more and urge him to speak up and do you think Kennedy would have escalated the war the way McNamara had advised Johnson another's thanks. My this may not be to do the popular response. But I think that definitely Kennedy would have gone down that same path. I think that there's there's nothing to indicate that that JFK would have been less likely to follow the the Vietnam policy. He was very committed to that and I I don't think he would have A significant difference Steven the on your reading and I agree. We have to remember that the advisors who came up with the Vietnam policy which led to I would say an over commitment of American forces were all the Kennedy advisors was McNamara. It was McGeorge Bundy was Maxwell Taylor was Henry Cabot Lodge from Kennedy pick member Kennedy was assassinated in Johnson suddenly steps into Administration filled with Kennedy people and part of the tension here. I think and going to do while I'm at in the mirror that did what he did was it McNamara was caught up in the myth of Camelot where the Kennedy people were tough and hard and they believe the numbers and statistics and McNamara is good friend and then Patron Bobby Kennedy who remember what sort of sulking and semi Exile and what he challenged Johnson or would he not Bobby Kennedy have nailed the American flag to the wall of Vietnam say we will never leave we will never be defeated. So I think to a large extent McNamara's loyalty was to Jack Kennedy and Bobby Kennedy, so we sort of hung on with that matchup. New Frontier bear any burden pay any price and because of that could not confront this this ugly reality which was growing underneath him. Was there a point at which we should have for pulled out or I mean, I believe we shouldn't have been there in the first place. So the point at which we should have pulled out woodbend as soon as possible opportunity that again is is an interpretation about what do you think the whole policy made sense or not arguing that shortly after the assassination of diem. They're the South Vietnamese leader was time to have time to go which is an interesting point in terms of what is a moral thing for great nation to do because he got it was Kennedy people averell Harriman & Rodger hilsman Rodger hilsman with his gung-ho counterinsurgency guy who so committed the United States to overthrowing ziam in this sort of crude and rude away. No effort to find a transition to a better government. We an effect precipitated the very chaos at McNamara now in retrospect. Complains about I think it's kind of unfair for great power to precipitate chaos and then say Oh, you people you little people over there in Asia. You can't get your act together. We're out of here. So I think Johnson did the correct thing which was to say, I know we're going to stay the course what I think we went wrong was in 64 and 65 McNamara and his team Focus too much on the military and not enough on the political side. They were groups are Vietnamese nationalist leaders who came together after gem who had the very same pacification program that worked for years later in 1969 and 70 and in effect. We lost four years the four years during which we said all these Americans over there if we worked with the Vietnamese on pacification earlier. I think we could have prevailed with no large American losses your question. I want to ask a question. I have studied the Vietnam war in the gradual classes and so forth and I disagree with his analysis on Ho Chi Minh. I think if you look at the correspondence that he wrote to various Western leaders after World War II after they declared independence that you'll see it was a lack of response from the West in supporting their intended impact supporting French and British colonialism that it kind of made Ho Chi Minh look for other avenues of support and let him to to Communism to the Communist Nations for means of support for his struggle against French and I just like to hear your comments on that. I'm sure I to two points one. We need to call the Ho Chi Minh was one of the founders of the French Communist party in 1920. I think it was so it's intellectually ideologically as a young man. He went to France in 1911 and adopted Western viewpoints. Any adopted communism as his own personal ideology secondly in the. You're referring to 1945 Orly 46 at the end of World War II. It was actually the French who built up Ho Chi Minh who supported him a freshman by name was Ross Anthony and what hole in his small group of Communists were doing was looking for far and support that use the Chinese General Luhan and they use the French and in late 45 and early 46. They had a tactical alliance with the French in order to assassinate the Nationalist leaders such as these names like drunk the end of the year party at Lido mojados Wisin party at later on when food show the founder of the wild how religion was assassinated and it was really those assassinations which set up the conflict between the Communists in the Nationalist. My position has been that if whole were genuinely a nationalist first, he would have always preserve a broad united front coalition for the Communists would have shared power with non-communist, but they never did that and therein lies a great tragedy. Is relevant to our situation today in what way in terms of nationalism in and our response to it. I'd like to come and I think it could be very very relevant to what could be called reconciliation in Vietnam reconciliation is an English word. It's a very difficult word for me to use because it has been used by the communist Vietnamese for so long to me that well, we'll have reconciliation you the Nationalist reconciled to me the kindness to the present time. I use the word like let's not have retribution and what some communist leaders including some comrades of Ho Chi Minh are saying is let's go back to this. Of of national unity in 45 and 46 when the Communist party was technically abolished and and let's try to have the rhetoric of Ho Chi Minh from 45 and 46 what we talked about success nationalism and the great Unity of all the people I believe there are many non-communist to have sacrificed. Live in the concentration camps for years who are prepared now for the future to let bygones be bygones and somehow deal with an evolving Communist party situation. If the Communists will share power. Then there can be a peaceful Revolution if the Communists refuse to share power there will be continued depression and maybe chaos in the streets. So it's very relevant at this time. If how could Ford be seen it sort of in retrospect graciously saving everybody's face as more of a nationalist and is communism is kind of face down and that would help getting on with the present time. Ironically pressure reading. My reading is that we can we can argue forever about whether he'll was with more primarily prime minister more primary. Not a nationalist. I think that we can't rehashing the history of the last 50-70 years here. I think that there's an issue that that we always look for simple good and bad guys and if he was a communist he was bad if it was national state was good, I think The world is not that simple and we have to look at each situation out of exactly what Nationals are doing whether they are in fact or call themselves Socialist Communist capitalist Democrat that is is the name and label is not so important. It's just what they do and I think that in fact Ho Chi Minh was clearly a communist in the sense that he was involved in the Communist party was that that I had that identification. I think he was also clearly a nationalist and that he was a unifying force for the Vietnamese people during the fight against the French and later the fight against the Americans, although he has been dead since 1969. So this is this is a history, but I think that whatever ideological affiliations he clearly was concerned with with Vietnamese Independence. Go back to the phones Johnson line from Brainerd. Go ahead sir. Yes. Hello in that whole human tragedy. and I just want to know the financial exploitation Vietnam experiencing on cold starting maybe with not starting but with Oliver Stone's college boy goes to Vietnam and then they've got the American Travel Agency arranging bike trips for Bourgeois bikers and no McNamara comes out with his Book after all these years and good free publicity for him to sell if you copy that maybe $20 a crack. And I'm tired of the whole thing. I think a lot of Vietnam veterans that were difficult things down to cope with his realizing that they were pawns for the money grubbers, you know, right from the beginning to the end of the reign of the river is going to be the end of this whole thing and that's basically my comment. Thank you agree. There's there's a lot of exploitation Deb. I mean, they've been some suggestions that perhaps mr. McNamara is really interested in and moving ahead and making some amends for what he believes to be a mistake that he might consider donating all the royalties from his book to some kind of Charities perhaps I have to American veterans groups and 1/2 to working with you. But I agree there's there's a lot of a lot of people that have made a lot of money on on a lot of people suffering do the Vietnamese agonize over this as much as we do in this country the big war why I don't believe so, I think that people in Vietnam are generally more adjusted in terms of I suspect him in the same way that people here are more adjusted to World War II, I mean World War II was a tragedy or is horrible no matter what if you were an instrument and World War II you so horrible things you but people somehow adjust And digest the event and I think in Vietnam people have certainly digested and adjusted to the horrors of that war from their perspective. I think our continuing inability to to put it in context has more to do with the fact that it's it's it's the first time we've seen ourselves as losing a war that it's the first time we have have never resolved the questions about whether it was right or wrong. There's also been this I think terrible way that our society is treated the Vietnam vet the Vietnam soldier and the way the vets and those of us who serve done things to ourselves. This may be too simplistic Gary but I was sent it was totally right for the Revolution Let's Go like a compact between the soldiers in the citizen to know if you went off and you fought for truth beauty Justice American Way against King George her or whatever that you came back and you were you are more than respected it matter how much money you had or whatever people would buy you a drink you get the March 4th of July you were some What happened to the young man who were who were drafted into Vietnam? Are they what they did what they were told to do. They they will they honor the obligation to serve their country that accepted things. They fought in a war which was not a good warm. It was better than any previous Wars has and for the soldiers as and then they came back and what happens they were blamed the generals were playing the political leaders were playing the macnamaras weren't playing. These are the guys you came home. You can't talk to your wife about it. Can't tell your kids you carry these scars psychological scars. You paid you did what the right thing an American man should do and you came back from America that was in cultural turmoil and there are cases were the people that's badass but I came back to Harvard and people wouldn't shake my hand Grandma Alice's who was the head of the Kennedy School who by the way and it would not in the mob scene with McNamara November 66 when I say McNamara's by Harvard crowd in Graham was the driver of the car. He drives off I come back from getting out and won't even shake my hand. I mean at least a certain feeling in you as an American thing and and it's not over yet. Responding to the comment as long as we have these deep emotional feelings people going to make money off of it the analogy Steve. I think of the OJ Simpson trial. The money that's being made off the OJ Simpson trial but why there's something fascinating about this this this murder that's the way our system works and we have this commercialism where a few people are going to make a lot of money off the sufferings of so many I thought the Persian Gulf War was supposed to have exercised our demons on this and put to an end once and for all the Vietnam syndrome. That was a mess of a there are two unrelated events. I just don't agree with Levi it was that was sort of the wish of Washington sort of inside the Beltway folks, but it it's not where the people live. How do you do away with the psychological scars or something like that. You can't you got to go into it and we have to find a way to deal with it. Somehow. I don't have any answers. Did Annette though at least restore respect in this country for the US military? I don't I don't I don't think they're unrelated issues. I I think that there's been a horrible confusion about respect for individual actions and individual military personnel and and policy and I die. I just think those two were separate when I was in the military. I didn't nobody ever asked me about the policy and 18 year old kids from New York in Kentucky and everywhere else that went to Vietnam on bait making decisions on information. They had at the time when asked about policy in and I think that it was that the more thoughtful portions of the anti-war movement made that distinction early on there were members of the anti-war movement who didn't make that distinction just as they were members of the military who made transgressions in Vietnam is my life. So I but I don't think you can condemn all of us military because of the actions of a few and in situations such as my life and I think you can condemn all of the all of the anti-war movement for incidents such as spitting on vets coming back. I think the fact is that the military people could be respected if they made decisions in and conducted themselves with honor and they the policy issue the McNamara Is the Johnsons The Nixons the Kennedys are another entire issue both of whom I served in Vietnam and both of them been working in Vietnam since Vernon your next place during a rather long extended discussion of the events in Vietnam, and I'm the lessons that we should have learned from Vietnam. It seems to me that one of the most important is that our American president should be honest with the American people every president from Eisenhower through Johnson and Nixon lied to the American people and and it's it's resulted in a tremendous sentence with respect to any any aspect almost any aspect of foreign policy today cynicism that says we can't really trust our leaders to tell us Truth about what they're asking us to do about this issue of honesty in government The credibility gap I think was the term used at the time I guess is as one of the the people born in the forties to came of political Consciousness in the fifties. I'm of the last generation of people who actually believe what the government told them and I think that it is it's it's unfortunate. I think it is a serious difficulty in our in our country because I I think we really did believe and as sense since the sixties and in all the events, since there's been a horrible LED destruction of any kind of of of faith in what the government is saying and I I don't have any answers or Solutions, but I don't think that any society can function in the long run without some kind of consensus credibility and Trust Vern Eide I agree with you, but I think the issue of distresses is deeper than just the Vietnam War something began happening in the society in the sixties with I guess more My Generation Steven yours, I guess I'm on the cusp of a deeper problem. But I think you're right in and I've been sort of thinking about this again over the weekend with his McNamara business because McNamara's Memoirs and whether we should have resigned or not resigned or what he told Johnson and what should be secret and what should be publicized. I think it's at the core of this and what comes to my mind is the way either human beings or else we Americans get caught up in our political group some cleats and rivalries. Just my sense was in this. Johnson's fear was that if if he broke with McNamara or McGeorge Bundy and anyway, and they went over to Bobby Kennedy, but then the whole Kennedy side of the democratic party would sort of organized and call it Johnson's war and then used it. If Johnson pulled out of Vietnam the Kennedys would go after him for not being tough if Johnson escalated into Not the Kennedys we go after him, you know for for doing something at Jack wouldn't have done and and how that Vortex support personal ambition and pettiness and Washington dominates the way people decide to keep secrets is something that we need to think about because it seems to go on and on and on let us assume for a moment if we can put ourselves back there in terms of trying to talk about today and politicians being honest. Well, let's say for example that can today or later Johnson. American people said while this is kind of a big deal that were involved with ugly. It's probably going to get a lot uglier. I'm not entirely sure that what we're doing is going to work but let's send another hundred thousand guys over and check it out and I would have been the honest thing to say. What do you suppose the response would have been well, that's that's very interesting cuz I've talked to some friends in the military of your generals and strategist and we got Colonel up on the plane. I think one of the problems of the failures of McNamara was that he never focused for Johnson, they clear endgame and so the Johnson would have had to say something like that and I think most Americans would have said no, this is just a slippery slope. Is it going down into a quagmire fight constantly giving Johnson incremental decisions McNamara in particular? Never allow Johnson to say what is our results we want to conquer North Vietnam. Do we want to just defend Saigon? It was always sort of a will put it a little bit more and see if that works which raises another issue when I think it's serious of the of the responsibility for military generals because they wanted clear goals. They were the older General to come out of World War II and Korea what kind of curmudgeons frankly I didn't know much about hearts and minds and didn't care. I fought them on that. But the one thing I understood as if you fight a war you tell me what you want me to take Berlin take Tokyo across the river or what they went along with McNamara civilian leadership of this incremental decision-making and they never sort of went to Johnson to look. Mr. President. What you want to do here, you know, do you want to win the war not win the war we never forced Clarity for our decision-makers in the mid-60s and because of that we split into something less than that. We have learned because you here all the time from the Pentagon now we want to we want to clear set of defined objections. Then there's that exit strategy we out here. That's a term that gets booted. How to make it clear how we're going to get out of this thing is that at least one thing that we've learned there's a there's at least an effort that that's been identified as a reasonable position how well it's executed any particular instances always up to question, but I think that's a lesson John the question, please. Curry leaving office. He was starting to bring the troops counts down. He was actually starting to pull out and when Nixon got in he increase the troops increase the bombing and probably more people were killed under the Nixon Administration than Johnson Kennedy combined and I guess my question is is why is all the focus on Johnson and and Kennedy and not Nixon Because by the time Nixon guy then everybody most of them are people were at least understanding that the war was probably wrong at that time. I I think that it has more to do with Origins then with trying to parcel Out Who had most culpability for most deaths or whatever. I think that there's certainly enough blame to go around if you consider the policy is I do to be flawed to start with but whether Nixon Nixon just came later in the process and so he's less often cited but I don't think that there's an implication that he certainly is that he's guilty as her has no culpability it was he was President. He could see the pile so you could have have moved out sooner than he did. Chola back to the phones billion x from 65 to 67 in Vietnam and I think that so many of the talk shows and don't take good advantage of the expertise of your radio host. We're starting to make and we have over the past fifteen years. We tried repeat many of the arrows that were made in beginning. The Vietnam war that is the intelligence was poor weather Ho Chi Minh was a nationalist with communist leanings or a communist through and through is there a irrelevant from the point of discussion because now we need to see that we had inadequate intelligence as to what was going on in Vietnam in the first place. Secondly, the country was never mobilized to fight a war. Our men were being sent over there with inadequate supply lines and with an inadequate political motive and there was no end at the others no light at the end of the tunnel and all the rules of War for making War The Clash what's put down a long time ago? Broken and you can see that when you talk to the congressman in New Jersey who want us to get into Yugoslavia area Panama Grenada Lebanon the leaders in Washington. Do not follow the rules and the younger Americans get killed for it. That's why I feel bad will let me pick up fill your point about clausewitz that again focus is back on Origins as we were just talkin and McNamara in his book clothes, which really gives us a continue up. He says war is an extension of politics by other means so it won't end of the Continuum is sort of pure politics discussion dialogue peaceful resolution of disputes. The other end of the Continuum presumably is nuclear Armageddon for the most ultimate form of War we have and they're all these gradation points in the middle what the Kennedy administration in McNamara believed in fairy self-consciously is it we Americans could could have precisely apply Force Indiscreet increments in the middle of the Continuum of the doctor. Limited Warfare counterinsurgency the way they handled the Cuban Missile Crisis. And so you have a little bit of War a little bit of politics and in retrospect. I think two questions that arise from this is one can American people really accept such a kind of sophisticated almost mathematically precise application of force. I don't think they can I order people you need to do what you don't do it. Secondly if you are going to do what you got to do it with trained professionals who are volunteers not a not a drafted Army and thirdly ice in my mind. There may be a question that that middle range in the closets in that is doesn't maybe really exist in life because when you're short of shooting in one hand and a go shooting on the member Johnson would sort of increase the troops one month and then you have a bombing pause the next month that they'd somehow war in the reality of human conflict doesn't admit to these kind of antiseptic almost sort of clinical techniques one quick, and I agree with everything. The caller said, I think that that the key issue is in Thai And the problem seems to me that the really disturbing problem is that the intelligence was never used but I can't believe that the intelligence wasn't available. I can't believe that all of these Harvard boys didn't have access to the information that they say they'll act in that can fax it if they just read Graham Greene and literature class. They certainly are The Quiet American had some some sense of something going on. I'd like to pick up on that and challenge supposed to call her and do Steve because I think we had adequate intelligence. And I think the intelligence was was adequate that would probably was not a failure of intelligence a free sample Grant Green Grand Prix rotors book against this American at Lansdale. It was in Vietnam Badlands. There was a brilliant man. He knew lots of stuff. We had a lots of other people who do an excellent telligence. In fact, I brought along today the 1961 and 1965 white papers of our state department. I have stood the test of time very very well or our intelligence was accurate. And so if we How to find out what went wrong from our perspective we have to look elsewhere wasn't intelligence. Now and we're going to settle that way and I don't want to get into a long discussion about Bosnia. Should we go into BIOS me or not, but let's say that you two were asked. Okay. Now it would you can you write in a minute or so analyze the the Bosnia situation to intervene or not to intervene based on what we supposedly learned from Vietnam, but I'm not sure that that I think that's a whole different ball game and I'm not sure that that the Vietnam lessons will give you the answer to that I if I were pressed to make an analysis, I think there is some some real problems with going into buys the end and I on on a basis of the whole analysis that I don't think I should use to take up this time would say that my my call would be no not because of necessarily lessons of Vietnam, because of political military realities that I would say, no, but I don't think Vietnam will give you the answer to Bosnia. So I'd say they're two two parallels between Bosnian Vietnam one is you have to find a way to stop the infiltration of metamaterials coming in from Serbia until you have to make sure the Russians do not then come in and made the serbians were the serbs in Bosnia and in the second hole parallel to get a developing the indigenous a military political capacity you would you send advisors over to work with a Bosnian Muslims? How would you build up the Bosnian Muslim capability to defend its own territory your question, please at first and then go to a question. I think if we if we're going to be talking about this tremendous time in our history, we should clarify some terms and we should be fairly honest with terms. I've heard Mr. Young use the terms a great moral purpose and I've also heard him talk about pacification which was his Focus there. In fact pacification. I had a particular meeting there The Phoenix Program with a probe. Designed to assassinate two hundred thousand civilians believing that that was the way to pacify the situation and end the war on mr. Young was very high placed in that program architect of The Phoenix Program of the way. It's usually put a program that actually did kill 20 to 30,000 people by assassination civilians non-combatants, and I don't understand how anybody who was involved in that type of a program it going to sit here and lecture the rest of us about moral purpose. I'll hang up. No, please stay on the line Steve Young speaking. Well, I've never given me such responsibility for The Phoenix Program my ever before and I can say in all honesty. It said not deserve that was not involved with Phoenix. And anyway The Phoenix Program was one of I think 7 subcomponents of what was call The Children season of the rural development programme and was only one at 7. What I was primarily interested in over. So I was a deputy District adviser into districts and then long and then what Inside out working on the general pacification program. My concerns were decentralisation of power down to Village government Village elections real credit programs and local development program the total combination Land Reform rural development, including Phoenix statue High program and everything else. I serve to a really mobilize the people of South getting them behind the government buy 1972 And therefore I don't like the best vacation either IO usually use the term political development of rural development, but I think you kind of have to back down from this notion that Phoenix was this this great monsters ogre cuz it wasn't the way you described it or people assassinated the civilian leaders in in South Vietnam. There were nothing in the program. I don't know people were killed Vietnamese going out for the police force seeking out the leadership of the Viet Cong. I'm sure people were killed assassination is a pretty gruesome work. They was a legal structure Behind The Phoenix Program which the critics of Phoenix never 10 to talk about. The legal structure was actually based on measures taken in Ireland and Northern Ireland, which has been approved by the European court of justice, which was you had to have information proving that somebody was a participating member of an armed Insurrection reforce then if you could do that those individuals were subject to arrest most of the people's I understand who were who were killed who are not military who not in the military units were killed in some sort of combat or police action the notion that the people are out looking to assassinate innocent civilians walking by and Village Trail from my experience, which was mostly in the Delta. Not correct. I guess I can only speak to what I know from personal experience. I was I was in a hundred first airborne. When we went out in platoon size actions, we fought other military units, so I wasn't involved first time with Phoenix Program. However, during the time that I was in Vietnam 68-69 I had contact with with American troops who were in special forces units or were advisors to Arvin units and second-hand reports that that those people who worked with Arvin units and worked with The Phoenix Program did in fact go to Villages and take People who have been identified as Communists officials and assassinate some number. I don't know. There's no those things there is there's a whole literature on The Phoenix Program and I'm not an expert on it. And what's documented was documented. I can't say for sure. I believe based on the documentation of conversations. And in fact The Phoenix Program did take some number of of civilians out at night in execute them and that it was primarily done with arvin's and American advisors. I don't think that you would find American regular units like the first of the first cab Brothers involved in such things, but I think they happened and I think that Americans were involved both directly and indirectly is as advisers and as as architecture the program your question place I should be signed draft use of the u.s. Be sent to a conflict where Congress will not Declare War. What was the meaning of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and who did the u.s. Declare war against in? Conflict in Vietnam. Thank you. I don't think we have time for that. I don't think they obviously the US didn't declare war which is a technicality. I think that the the Tonkin Revel it resolution was also one of those things that that was used it by an interpreted by many people in different ways and was was the point at which people then referred to the the ability to go ahead and escalate the war and I I really I think that it's those are those are questions that go Way Beyond what we can do about the draft though. It did to the War 2 clearly led to the elimination of the draft is that they in retrospect a good thing bad thing. I think it's a bad thing. I have always supported a draft during the during the war before the war and after the war and as far as I'm concerned in terms of if a country is it makes makes legitimate policy then Maybe no problem with the draft and if a country makes bad policies, then people have the prospect of breath resistance. I mean there could have been no draft resistance without a draft. I think that that the lack of a draft removes people and sanitizes government policies in a way. That's unhealthy. I agree with Steve. The other thing is the paper this morning about the consequences of low re-enlistments and are now professional volunteer force. And so the recommendations are to spend a lot more money on taking care of our our military at some point in a Democratic Society if you pamper your military and it becomes a closed group who were the only associate with themselves with 30-year military career, you have a political problem for yourself. The draft is your basic check against military domination of a society and I think it was a mistake to give it up. Steve is on the line from Saint Cloud with a question. You're coming with red China sponsored by the Earl Brown Institute in the Minneapolis. And they it was quite the consensus by these World experts that forced economies. We're going to be the thing of the future to get these countries up and running. And I would guess Ho Chi Minh was a nationalist who had visions of a forced economy. Secondly, the 1954 Peace Accords were signed by France and Vietnam United States didn't sign him at all United States really send a representative. We had no business in Vietnam. That was a civil war. And also one of the gentleman said what was wrong, why didn't we win the war? I guess what I would like to know is how would you go about winning it? How would you have done it? Okay, let's say let's take that last one now in retrospect again. Let's assume we could protect ourselves back and it said an early sixties and and there's a good likelihood that thing that you can kind of sense that things aren't working the way you have thought maybe they would but you've decided by golly. We're going to we don't want it to end the way we know it's going to add we don't want to be a loser in this thing. We want to win the war. Is that even possible here? And if so, how you doing? I think that Steve's question because my answer is a simple I wouldn't because of my interpretations of the policy in the situation. I don't think it was a war that we should have won that we should have been in the first place. So if you're if you shouldn't be in it you shouldn't want it. I would say just don't do it. Just don't that's my response was really based is based on lots of experience with lots of Vietnamese is piece of cake you do two things one. You have a successful rural development pacification program where you organize real development in self-defense groups in that Land Reform all of which we did. Secondly you encourage a political Coalition of the of the basic Vietnamese nationalist forces, which are the wall how religion the cao-dai religion the Buddhist the Catholics and you add to that the key political parties, which of the various groups of the Vietnam cooking Band Party the dive York parties does wheezing party in there several others. And again that Coalition basically came together not in a pretty neat way, but it came together after 1967 if those two things have been done in the early sixties unders yet, which was my father's playing like really are a piece of history is Dad when it up his Ambassador in Thailand Robin Ambassador was Jim I think of my dad have been a bastard was young from 61 to 63. I will never would have had to escalate we never would have lost. Let me go see ideas you work in the rural areas. You can you create a National Coalition from the national is leadership. You get good military leaders. We tend to overlook at the South Vietnamese had some very excellent military units which were as good or better than North Vietnamese communist leadership. And if you look at their leaders the South Vietnamese leaders, you will find people from the Dai Viet going to be in qtd of political Traditions, but we never really went out of her way to help those Folks at least one more collar Lowell. Yes, I have a question that came up very early in the show about did the politicians get in the way of the military's ability to wage an effective wart. And of course the word win especially in our society has many meanings example accomplishments could be another word we could use and an answer or two have been brought for us regarding the on-again-off-again bombing policies and not going into other countries to get two parts of the Ho Chi Minh trail and in terms of the airwar weren't their strategic Target limits and Rules of Engagement limits and just limits in our ability to apply the same force that eventually closed the Korean War and did win the Gulf War that were never used properly. We don't have a lot of time left, but what's your thought on that state? My thought is that they're made there were certain restrictions. But I think that the amount of bombing that was done both in the north and along the Ho Chi Minh trail was significant and that in a while. It could have been increased. I don't think there's anything that indicates that that an increase would have significantly changed the outcome unless you're talking about some sort of total nuclear Annihilation, which I don't think was acceptable to anyone. I think they were a great many Rules of Engagement on forced to a large extent. I absolutely except those particular those inside Vietnam, which route cuz I protected civilians and non-combatants, but secondly again back to McNamara there was this whole notion of the gradual application of force particular the bombing campaign Rolling Thunder against the North and it didn't work some people feel that if we had much less bombing, but if it'd been concentrated as in the Iraq War, it would have been more effective with my real objection to the bombing program. Is it it diverted everybody's attention away from the battle in the rural areas in South I'm in 65 and 66. So it diverted resources and gained a lot of negative publicity. And from that point of you who it was it was not an effective use of American time talent and energy by the end of this decade will we have put this behind us in some significant way or will this debate the lawn? I think when are generation dies will be over because one possible alternative that if Vietnam becomes Democratic and we will suddenly get to see the truth from the inside of the Vietnamese and I personally am convinced that that truth will allow Americans to come to terms with our history that we were not bad. We were not wrong in this war you guys happy that you were involved in one fashion or another I don't know if happy is that is the best where I I don't have any regrets about decisions. I made I certainly have benefited in some ways for my experience in Vietnam. I don't think that except I I'm not I don't have any regrets. I I I have a lot of regrets that it was too we did not have a successful outcome because it's affected my life in many ways. The struggle goes on. I feel I'm still involved in that other things like wish I could have done. Thank you gentlemen preciate you coming by Stephen young and Steve Sherlock been good enough to come by today to talk about the legacy of the Vietnam War and there's some of the lessons that we perhaps have learned or could learn from that conflict.

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